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Abstract
This paper proposes a general measure of the eﬀective number of parties, based on the family of general-
ized entropy inequality indices. This measure encompasses existing measures in the sense that these can
be derived, through an appropriate con￿guration of parameter values, from this general measure. The
proposed measure has attractive properties both in terms of interpretation and in terms of aggregation.
In terms of interpretation, this measure always yields a value between 1 and N (N=the number of parties
contesting) and takes one, or the other, extreme value depending on whether vote (or seats) are monop-
olized by a party or shared equally between the contesting parties. In terms of aggregation, it is always
the case that the eﬀective numbers of parties at sub-national levels can be aggregated to yield a national
￿gure. The aggregation is eﬀected through weights which, themselves, have an appealing interpretation
in terms of the diﬀerent sub-national contributions to overall inequality in the distribution of votes (or
seats). The use of this general measure is illustrated by applying it to the results of the 1997 and 2001
Parliamentary (Westminster) elections in Northern Ireland. The central message of the paper is that the
construction of indices or measures which purport to give scalar representation to vectors of distributive
outcomes cannot be wholly based on ￿objective￿ considerations. This observation applies in full to the
measurement of the eﬀective number of parties in a political system.
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An important aspect of the analysis of electoral outcomes is the evaluation of the distribution
of votes and/or seats across political parties. For example, assessing the proportionality of an
electoral system requires a comparison of the distribution of seats with the distribution of votes
(Gallagher, 1991, Lijphart, 1995). Another example is provided by measures of the ￿eﬀective￿
number of parties in a system. As Lijphart (1995) notes, the problem here is how to count parties
of diﬀerent size and the assumption in the comparative politics literature is that some kind of
weighting is required to solve this problem.
In essence, calculating the eﬀective number of parties in a system involves assigning a scalar
value to a vector of inter-party distribution of seats or votes. At one extreme, this scalar value
will (should) equal the number of parties that actually contest the election. This will occur when
votes (or seats) are distributed equally among the parties. At the other extreme, this scalar value
will (should) equal unity. This will be the case when all votes (or seats) accrue to just one party.
In between the these extremes, the eﬀective number of parties will be greater than one, but less
than the number of parties contesting.
The general theme that underpins both examples is that of inequality analysis. Indeed, some
of the well-known measures of both proportionality and eﬀective number of parties are based on
inequality indices. For example, the Lassko-Taagepera (L-T) measure of the eﬀective number of
parties (Lassko and Taagepera, 1979) - which is regarded as the ￿widely accepted formula￿ for such
calculations1 - is based explicitly on the Her￿ndahl (1950) index. However, one of the drawbacks
of existing analysis of such problems is that it does not do more than scratch the rich vein of
methodology that the study of inequality provides. To use the language of Cowell (1995), many of
the measures, that are currently widely-used, came about more or less by accident with concepts
borrowed from statistics being pressed into service as tools of proportionality measurement.
1 Chhibber (1999), p. 54.
1Against this background, this paper proposes a general measure of the eﬀective number of
parties, based on the family of generalized entropy inequality indices. This measure encompasses
existing measures in the sense that these can be derived, through an appropriate con￿guration of
parameter values, from this general measure. The proposed measure has attractive properties both
in terms of interpretation and in terms of aggregation. In terms of interpretation, this measure
always yields a value between 1 and N (N=the number of parties contesting) and takes one, or
the other, extreme value depending on whether vote (or seats) are monopolized by a party or
shared equally. In terms of aggregation, it is always the case that the eﬀective numbers of parties
at sub-national levels can be aggregated to yield a national ￿gure. The aggregation is eﬀected
through weights which, themselves, have an appealing interpretation in terms of the diﬀerent sub-
national contributions to overall inequality in the distribution of votes (or seats). The use of this
general measure is illustrated by applying it to the results of the 1997 and 2001 Parliamentary
(Westminster) elections in Northern Ireland.
2 Generalized Entropy Inequality Indices
There are N parties contesting an election. Let vi ≥ 0 represent the vote share2 of party i where
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if β 6=0and h(z)=−log(z) if β =0 (1)
then the family of Generalized Entropy (GE) Inequality Measures, G(β), is obtained in any of the



























































2 Though the analysis works equally well for seat shares
2The logic of this class of measures is as follows. Suppose a random variable x can take values
x1...xN with probabilities p1...pN, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
P
pi =1 . Hence the information content hi of ob-
serving x take the value xi can be regarded as a decreasing function of pi:i fpi is large/small, then
it would not/would be a surprise if x = xi and so the ￿information content￿, hi, of the observation
would be small/large (Renyi, 1965). A measure of the ￿expected amount of information￿ or en-
tropy conveyed by the observations, x1...xN is e =
P
pih(pi) and equation (1), above, represents
a formulation of the ￿information content￿ function, h(.) in terms of a parameter β.
The measure of inequality G(β), in equation (2a), is obtained by subtracting the actual entropy
of the distribution of votes across the N parties, v1...vN, from the maximum possible value of
this entropy which obtains when every party gets an equal share of votes (vi =1 /N ∀i). The
expressions for G(β) in equations (2b) and (2c) are derived from that in equation (2a), using - in
t h ec a s eo fe q u a t i o n( 2 c )-t h ee x p r e s s i o nf o rh(.) from equation (1).































where: Vi is the number of votes received by party i and ﬂ V = N−1 P
i Vi is the mean of the votes
received by the parties. The expression for G(0) in equation (3) is Theil￿s inequality index (Theil,
1967)
For β 6=0 , under perfect equality (vi =1 /N ∀i), G(β)=0and, under perfect inequality






; for β =0 , the corresponding values are G(0) = 0 under
perfect equality, and G(0) = log(N) under perfect inequality.
33 Generalized Entropy Measures of the Eﬀective Number
of Parties
Now consider the linear transformation:
H(β)=a + bG(β) (4)
such that: H(β)=1 /N if vi =1 /N ∀i (that is, there is perfect equality); and H(β)=1if vi =1
for some i (that is, there is perfect inequality). If one could eﬀect such a transformation then a





Such a measure would have the following appealing properties:
1. Under perfect equality, with all parties getting an equal number of votes, H(β)=1 /N ⇒
Ω(β)=N:t h ee ﬀective number of parties would be equal to the actual number of parties.
2. Under perfect inequality, with all votes accruing to a single party, H(β)=1⇒ Ω(β)=1 :
the eﬀective number of parties would be 1.
3. As inequality increased/decreased (the value of G(β) and, therefore, of H(β) rose/fell), the
eﬀective number of parties would fall/rise: dΩ(β)/dH(β) < 0
4. Properties 1-3, above, would be valid for all values of β
In order to realize the transformation of equation (4), with its attendant properties, set vi =











⇔ a =1 /N (6)




































where: H(1) is the Her￿ndahl index (Her￿ndahl, 1950); and Ω(1) is the Lassko-Taagepera (L-
T) measure of the eﬀective number of parties (Lassko and Taagepera, 1979). It is important to
emphasize that the L-T measure is a special case of the general measure proposed, obtained by
setting β =1in equation (5)3 . The signi￿cance of this restriction is discussed in the following
subsection.
For β =0 , the linear transformation:








ensures that, under perfect equality, H(0) = 1/N and, under perfect inequality, H(0) = 1. Conse-























where Properties 1-3, above, also hold for Ω(0).
4 The Interpretation of the β Parameter
All inequality indices should embody the weak principle of transfers. In the case under discussion,
this principle (also known as the Pigou-Dalton property: Dalton, 1920) requires that a transfer of
votes from a ￿larger￿ to a ￿smaller￿ party should cause the value of the inequality index H(β) to
fall. More precisely, consider two parties, one with V votes and the other with V +δ votes. Then,
3 In turn, the L-T measure encompasses Rae￿s (1971), index of ￿party system fractionalisation￿, F =1−
P
i vi
since Ω(1) = 1/(1 − F).
5by the weak principle of transfers, a transfer from the second (￿larger￿) to the ￿rst (￿smaller￿) party
of ∆V votes, ∆V<1
2δ, will cause inequality to fall and, as a consequence, the eﬀective number
of parties to rise. Since G(β),a sabona ￿de inequality index, satis￿es this principle, so does its
linear transform, H(β).
But by how much the value of the inequality index will fall - and, therefore, by how many the
eﬀective number of parties will rise - following this ￿egalitarian￿ vote transfer, will depend upon
the value of the parameter, β.T h ev a l u eo fβ, therefore, measures the ￿transfer sensitivity￿ of the
inequality index: the larger the value of β, the greater will be the fall in inequality - and the rise
in the eﬀective number of parties - following a a transfer of votes from a larger to a smaller party.
In the context of the ￿social welfare￿ approach to inequality measurement (Atkinson, 1970), the
value of β represents society￿s degree of ￿inequality aversion￿.
More formally, as a consequence of a transfer of ∆v of vote share from a ￿larger￿ party (i =2 )





















2) − (1 − v
β
1)]∆s =[ h(v2) − h(v1)]∆v (9a)
∆H = b[h(v2) − h(v1)]∆v (9b)
If one de￿nes a distance measure:











then the strong principle of transfers requires that the reduction in inequality, following an egal-
itarian transfer of ∆v (that is, a transfer from a larger to a smaller party), depends only upon
the distance between two shares, regardless of the parties between which the transfer is made.
An egalitarian transfer of ∆v from party 4 to party 3 will have the same eﬀect on reducing in-
equality as an egalitarian transfer from party 2 to party 1 if, and only if, the ￿distance￿ between
v4 and v3 is the same as the ￿distance￿ between v2 and v1 or, more formally, if and only if:
6λ(β,v 4,v 3)=λ(β,v 1,v 2). The greater the distance between two vote shares the larger will be the
fall in inequality following an egalitarian transfer of ∆v.
The family of GE inequality indices - discussed above - satis￿es the strong principle of transfers.
For the purposes of this discussion, the relevant point is that, given the vote shares of four parties,
v1 <v 2 <v 3 <v 4,s u c ht h a tv4 − v3 = v2 − v1:
λ(β,v 1,v 2) > λ(β,v 2,v 4) if β < 1
λ(β,v 1,v 2)=λ(β,v 2,v 4) if β =1
λ(β,v 1,v 2) < λ(β,v 2,v 4) if β > 1
so that, if β < 1 / β =1/β > 1, a transfer of ∆v from party 2 to party 1 will cause inequality to
fall (and, therefore, the eﬀective number of parties to rise) by an amount greater/equal/smaller
than the amount by which it would fall if the same transfer was eﬀected between parties 4 and 3.
This follows because, from equation (1):
dh
dz
= −zβ−1 < 0 and
d2h
dz2 = −(β − 1)zβ−2
so that h(.) curve is: linear if β =1(d2h/dz2 =0 ); convex to the origin if β < 1 (d2h/dz2 > 0);
and concave to the origin if β > 1 (d2h/dz2 < 0) .T h e s eo u t c o m e sa r es h o w ni nF i g u r e1.T h e
top curve relates to β =0 .5 and it is convex to the origin; the curve below it - the middle curve
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Figure1: Distance and values of β
Figure 1 shows that the distance between the shares 0.6 and 0.8 is the same as/less than/more
than the distance between the shares 0.2 and 0.4 when β =1 /β < 1/β > 1. Moreover, as the value
of β decreases from β =1 , the curves will become more convex, and as the value of β increases
from β =1they will become more concave. Therefore, the gap between the distances will increase
with higher (absolute) values of β : as β increases (from β =1 ) through negative4 /positive
values, we become increasingly more approving of egalitarian transfers at the lower/upper end
of the distribution. It is in this sense that β may be thought of as a ￿transfer sensitivity￿ (or,
equivalently, the ￿inequality aversion￿) parameter.
When β =1 , λ(β)=h(v1) − h(v2)=v2 − v1. Therefore, the implication of β =1is that the
distance between a party with a a 40% share of the vote and another with a 35% share is the
same as the distance between a party with a 7% share of the vote and another with a 2% share
o ft h ev o t e .C o n s e q u e n t l y ,a ni m p l i c a t i o no ft h eL - Tm e a s u r eo ft h ee ﬀective number of parties is
that a given change in vote shares, regardless of whether it occurred between a pair of mainstream
parties or between a pair of fringe parties, would cause the eﬀective number of parties to change
b yt h es a m ea m o u n t ,p r o v i d e dt h ed i ﬀerence in vote shares was the same between the two sets of
pairs.
However, if β < 1, then, using the preceding example, the distance between the mainstream
4 1,0 . 5 ,0 ,- . 5 ,- 1 etc.
8parties would be smaller than the distance between the fringe parties and if β > 1,i tw o u l db e
greater. Consequently, if β < 1/β > 1, a given change in vote shares would cause the eﬀective
number of parties to change by more/less if the change occurred between a pair of fringe parties
than if it occurred between a pair of mainstream parties. This is the point made by Wildgen (1971)
when he proposed a ￿hyperfractionalisation￿ measure of the eﬀective number of parties which
accorded a higher weight to smaller parties. In the context of the above analytical framework, he
was simply proposing a β < 1. On the other hand, Molinar (1991), who wanted a higher weight
to be assigned to the largest party, was arguing for a β > 1.
The restriction implied by β =1is not always appealing. For example, if, in Britain, the
Conservative share of the vote increased by 2 percentage points and the Labour party￿s share fell
by a corresponding amount then it would be hard to argue that the eﬀective number of parties
had changed. On the other hand, if the British National Party - a right-wing, anti-immigrant
party - increased its vote share by 2 percentage points, at the expense of say, the Green Party,
then that would be likely to increase the eﬀective number of parties in Britain in the sense that
the voice of both the British National Party and the Green Party would be heard in the nation￿s
political debate. The general measure of the eﬀective number of parties proposed in this paper -
oﬀering, as it does, a menu of choices between diﬀerent degrees of transfer sensitivity - is free of
such restriction5 .
5 Aggregation Issues
The eﬀective number of parties in a political system can refer to a variety of geographical areas,
ranging from a country, to regions within a country representing conglomeration of constituencies,
down to the individual constituencies themselves (Chhibber and Kollman, 1996; Chhibber and
Nooruddin, 1999). This section draws out the relationship between the eﬀective number of parties
i n ,s a y ,ac o u n t r ya n dt h ee ﬀective number of parties in the regions of that country.
5 Which is not say that one may not, if it is deemed appropriate, wish to adopt such a restriction.
9There are M (j =1 ...M) regions in the country with Nj parties contesting the elections in
region j.L e t vij ≥ 0 represent the vote share of party i in region j.T h e e ﬀective number of
parties in the country, Ω(β) can be written as a weighted sum of Ωj(β), the eﬀective numbers of


























































The weights wj in equation (10) may be interpreted as the ￿scaled￿ contribution of inter-party
vote-share inequality in a region to overall inter-party vote-share inequality. The scaling factor is
the inverse of, M, the number of regions: when M =1 , wj =1and Ω(β)=Ωj(β). In the special










which is the ratio of the value of the regional and national Her￿ndahl indices, scaled by the number
of regions.
6 Two Measures of Electoral Disproportionality
Electoral disproportionality measures the degree of discord between the proportion of votes re-
ceived by the various parties relative to the proportion of parliamentary seats obtained by them.
If si represents the proportion of seats obtained by party i, then a popular measure of dispropor-






(vi − si)2 =
















which is, essentially, the sum of the values of Her￿ndahl indices calculated on, respectively, vote
and seat shares less the covariance between the seat and vote shares.
Alternatively, one may de￿ne the degree of disproprtionality in an electoral system as the
ratio of the eﬀective number of parties calculated on vote shares (denoted Ωv(β))t ot h ee ﬀective






such that the system is perfectly proportional when σ =1and ￿disproportional￿ when σ > 1, with
higher values of σ being associated with greater degrees of disproportionality6 .W h e nβ =1 , the
eﬀective number of parties is de￿ned by the L-T measure and the degree of disproportionality is











7 A Numerical Example
Results from the 1997 and 2001 elections in Northern Ireland to the British Parliament (West-
minster) were used to put empirical ￿esh on the above analysis. These elections, which sent a
member of parliament from each of 18 constituencies in Northern Ireland to Westminster, were
contested on a ￿rst-past-the-post basis. Table 1 shows, for the 1997 election, the number of
parties that contested the elections from each of the 18 parliamentary constituencies of Northern
Ireland (column headed ￿N￿) and also the eﬀective number of parties, Ω(β), when, respectively:
β =1 ;β =0 .5; β =1 .5. T a b l e2d o e st h es a m ef o rt h e2 0 0 1 parliamentary elections.
6 When σ < 1, the eﬀect of the electoral system is to protect smaller parties. This is sometimes used to protect
geographical minorities. For example, elections to the US Senate award two seats to every state, regardless of their
respective sizes.
11The eﬀective number of parties when β =1is the reciprocal of the Her￿ndahl index calculated
on the constituency vote shares and thus corresponds to the L-T measure. The eﬀective number of
parties was highest when β =1 .5 and lowest when β =0 .5. This was because, given a distribution
of vote shares across the parties contesting an election in a constituency, higher values of β result in
lower values of the inequality index H. As Figure 1 shows, values of β > 1 compress the distance
between two vote shares, v1 <v 2 so that λ(β,v 1,v 2) <v 2 − v1; however, these distances are
in￿ated for β < 1 so that λ(β,v 1,v 2) >v 2 − v1; lastly, when β =1 , λ(β,v 1,v 2)=v2 − v1.S i n c e
the eﬀective number of parties is the reciprocal of the value of the inequality index, H, the result
follows.
The penultimate rows of Tables 1 and 2 show, for the 1997 and 2001 elections respectively,
t h em e a no ft h ee ﬀective number of parties in the constituencies. These mean values are not the
same as the eﬀective number of parties in Northern Ireland. This number - shown in the last row
of Tables 1 and Table 2 - is obtained from the eﬀective number of parties in the constituencies as
a weighted sum (see equation (10)) not as an arithmetic mean.
Northern Ireland has four major parties. Of these, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) are the unionist parties and Sinn Fein (SF) and the Social
Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) are the nationalist parties. Between them they won all the
18 parliamentary seats in Northern Ireland in 2001 and all, but one, in 1997. Collectively, they
received 87% of the vote in 1997 and 92% of the vote in 2001.W h e nβ =1 , the eﬀective number
of parties was calculated as 4.6 in 1997 and 4.7 in 2001;w i t hβ =0 .5, the higher value of the
inequality index reduced the eﬀective number of parties to 3.7; and with β =1 .5, the lower value of
the inequality index raised the eﬀective number of parties to 5.8. These results illustrate that the
the choice of a value for β, the transfer sensitivity parameter, can signi￿cantly aﬀect calculations
of the eﬀective number of parties in a system.
128 Conclusions
The central message of this paper is that the construction of indices or measures which purport
to give scalar representation to vectors of distributive outcomes cannot be wholly based on ￿ob-
jective￿ considerations. While there may be unanimity about the desirability of the value of an
index falling, consequent upon an egalitarian transfer (the weak principle of transfers), there will
inevitably be disagreement about the amount by which it should fall. The strong principle of
transfers says that this amount should depend only upon the distance between two distributive
positions but, as this paper has shown, the distance between two positions depends critically upon
the analyst￿s preferences about where in the income distribution he/she would most like to see re-
distribution eﬀected. In short, it depends upon the analyst￿s ￿transfer sensitivity￿ or, equivalently
￿aversion to inequality￿.
These remarks apply in full to the measurement of the eﬀective number of parties in a political
system. This measure, as has been shown, can be generated by taking the reciprocal of an index
drawn from the family of generalized entropy inequality indices. But the family member chosen will
determine the value of the inequality index and, hence, in￿uence the calculation of the eﬀective
number of parties. Choosing a member from the family reduces to choosing a value of β, the
￿transfer sensitivity￿ parameter. If the choice, as with the L-T measure of the eﬀective number of
parties, is β =1then (perhaps, without even being aware of it) the analyst is placing equal weight
on transfers at all levels. On the other hand, the analyst who chooses β < 1 places more weight
on transfers between smaller parties while the analyst who chooses β > 1 places more weight
on transfers between larger parties. The point is that the answer to the question ￿what is the
eﬀective number of parties?￿ depends partly upon the facts of electoral data, which will frame
the answer, but it also depends upon what is in the heart of the person to whom the question is
addressed.
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14Table 1
Effective Number of Parties in Northern Ireland
Westminster Elections, 1997
              constituency      β =1       β =0.5      β =1.5        N
             East Antrim        4.2        3.5        5.1         9
            East Belfast        3.3        2.7        4.1         9
        East Londonderry        4.0        3.3        4.8         8
Fermanagh & South Tyrone        2.7        2.4        3.0         5
                   Foyle        2.6        2.4        2.9         5
            Lagan Valley        2.8        2.4        3.2         8
              Mid-Ulster        2.9        2.5        3.5         6
          Newry & Armagh        2.9        2.6        3.3         5
            North Antrim        3.3        2.9        3.8         7
           North Belfast        2.8        2.5        3.3         7
              North Down        3.7        3.1        4.6         8
            South Antrim        2.6        2.5        2.9         6
           South Belfast        4.3        3.5        5.4        10
              South Down        2.5        2.3        2.8         5
              Strangford        3.2        2.8        3.8         7
              Upper Bann        3.6        3.0        4.2         8
            West Belfast        2.2        1.9        2.5         6
             West Tyrone        3.1        2.6        3.7         6
            Average over
          Constituencies        3.2        2.7        3.5       7.1
        Northern Ireland        4.6        3.7        5.8        10
N = number of parties contesting electionTable 2
Effective Number of Parties in Northern Ireland
Westminster Elections, 2001
            constituency        β =1       β =0.5      β =1.5        N
             East Antrim        3.5        3.0        4.1         7
            East Belfast        3.7        3.0        4.5         9
        East Londonderry        4.0        3.8        4.3         5
Fermanagh & South Tyrone        3.5        3.5        3.6         4
                   Foyle        2.9        2.6        3.1         5
            Lagan Valley        2.7        2.6        2.9         5
              Mid-Ulster        2.6        2.4        2.8         4
          Newry & Armagh        3.5        3.4        3.6         4
            North Antrim        3.0        2.8        3.3         5
           North Belfast        3.5        3.0        4.0         6
              North Down        2.2        2.0        2.6         6
            South Antrim        3.5        3.2        4.0         6
           South Belfast        3.2        2.7        3.9         8
              South Down        3.3        3.0        3.5         5
              Strangford        2.8        2.5        3.3         6
              Upper Bann        3.8        3.4        4.1         5
            West Belfast        2.1        1.9        2.3         7
             West Tyrone        2.9        2.9        2.9         3
            Average over
          Constituencies        3.1        2.9        3.5       5.7
        Northern Ireland        4.7        3.7        5.8         9
N = number of parties contesting electionTable 3
Party Vote Shares in Northern Ireland
Westminster Elections, 1997
           Constituency       DUP        UUP          SF        SDLP     Others
˝
˝
             East Antrim       19.5       38.8        1.6        4.6       35.6
˝
˝
            East Belfast       42.6       25.3        2.1        1.6       28.3
        East Londonderry       25.6       35.6        9.1       21.7        8.0
Fermanagh & South Tyrone        0.0       51.5       23.1       22.9        2.5
                   Foyle       21.5        0.0       23.9       52.5        2.0
            Lagan Valley       13.6       55.4        2.5        7.8       20.8
              Mid-Ulster       36.3        0.0       40.1       22.1        1.5
          Newry & Armagh        0.0       33.8       21.1       43.0        2.1
            North Antrim       46.5       23.6        6.3       15.9        7.7
           North Belfast        0.0       51.8       20.2       20.4        7.6
              North Down        0.0       31.1        0.0        4.4       64.5
            South Antrim        0.0       57.5        5.5       16.2       20.8
           South Belfast        0.0       36.0        5.1       24.3       34.6
              South Down        0.0       32.8       10.4       52.9        3.9
              Strangford       30.2       44.3        1.2        6.7       17.6
              Upper Bann       11.5       43.6       12.1       24.2        8.6
            West Belfast        0.0        3.4       55.9       38.7        2.0
             West Tyrone        0.0       34.6       30.9       32.1        2.5
       Northern Ireland       13.6       32.7       16.1       24.1       13.6
DUP = Democratic Unionist Party
UUP = Ulster Unionist Party
SF = Sinn Fein
SDLP = Social Democratic Labour Party
OTH = Other Parties
˝Table 4
Party Vote Shares in Northern Ireland
Westminster Elections, 2001
          Constituency       DUP          UUP        SF         SDLP     Others
             East Antrim       36.0       36.4        2.5        7.3       17.7
            East Belfast       42.5       23.2        3.4        2.4       28.5
        East Londonderry       32.1       27.4       15.6       20.8        4.1
Fermanagh & South Tyrone        0.0       34.0       34.1       18.7       13.2
                   Foyle       15.2        6.9       26.6       50.2        1.2
            Lagan Valley       13.4       56.5        5.9        7.5       16.6
              Mid-Ulster       31.0        0.0       51.2       16.7        1.0
          Newry & Armagh       19.4       12.3       30.9       37.4        0.0
            North Antrim       49.9       21.0        9.8       16.8        2.6
           North Belfast       40.8       12.0       25.2       21.0        0.9
              North Down        0.0       56.0        0.8        3.4       39.7
            South Antrim       34.8       37.1        9.4       12.1        6.7
           South Belfast        0.0       44.8        7.6       30.6       17.0
              South Down       15.0       17.6       19.7       46.3        1.3
              Strangford       42.8       40.3        2.2        6.1        8.6
              Upper Bann       29.5       33.5       21.1       14.9        1.0
            West Belfast        6.4        6.2       66.1       18.9        2.3
             West Tyrone        0.0       30.4       40.8       28.7        0.0
        Northern Ireland       22.5       26.8       21.7       21.0        8.1
DUP = Democratic Unionist Party
UUP = Ulster Unionist Party
SF = Sinn Fein
SDLP = Social Democratic Labour Party
OTH = Other Parties
˝